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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WHERE SHOULD WE 
GO FROM HERE? 
Sally Katzen* 
The Viscusi1 and Scales2
First, my bias: I am pro-CBA.  I believe CBA is a sensible and important 
input to rational decision making.  Indeed, I cannot imagine making 
regulatory choices (or legislative choices for that matter) without a 
systematic consideration of the intended (and unintended) consequences of 
a proposed action.  And to facilitate comparative evaluations of possible 
choices, it is helpful not only to quantify but also to monetize both the costs 
and the benefits of each of the proposals under consideration. 
 articles from Fordham University School of 
Law’s symposium entitled The Contemporary Regulatory State present an 
interesting discussion of some of the intricacies of cost/benefit analysis 
(CBA).  They talk about important issues, and I am tempted to weigh in.  
Resisting that impulse, however, I want to urge those infected with the 
cost/benefit bug—either pro or con—to devote some of their attention and 
energy to considering whether the agencies are implementing CBA 
appropriately and whether CBA is, in fact, producing better regulatory 
decisions.  If the answer to these questions is “only partially,” or “no,” I 
believe we should spend our time and resources identifying and addressing 
(and hopefully eliminating or minimizing) the obstacles to sensible 
regulatory decision making. 
Many of those participating in the Fordham symposium have been 
working to improve CBA methodology for some time now,3
 
*Currently, Visiting Professor, George Mason University School of Law.  Served as 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of 
Management and Budget from 1993 to 1998. 
 which is good 
because it needed a lot of work.  The calculation of the cost side of the 
 1. See W. Kip Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental Regulation, 
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  ADD INITIAL PAGE (2006). 
 2. See Adam Scales, How Much is That Doggy in the Window? The Inevitably 
Unsatisfying Duty to Monetize, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. ADD INITIAL PAGE (2006). 
 3. Kip Viscusi, Thomas Hopkins, and I were present, if not at the creation, then surely 
during the formative years.  We worked together in the Carter Administration at the Council 
on Wage and Price Stability in the late 1970s. 
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equation was relatively straightforward.4  The benefit side was appreciably 
more difficult,5 fueling the oft-repeated criticism that CBA does not present 
a level playing field.6  These critics assert (correctly) that, in looking only 
at the monetized costs and benefits, it not infrequently appears that the costs 
are greater than (“outweigh”7 or “[do not] justify”8) the benefits of a 
proposal, even though total costs may not exceed total benefits when 
nonmonetized benefits are considered.9  In this way, the critics argue, CBA 
is inherently biased against regulation.  Probably true, but there has been a 
great deal of work in this area, and we are at least approaching parity in 
our ability to monetize costs and benefits.10
Let me put to one side another criticism of CBA: the criticism 
questioning the morality of putting a dollar value on body parts or on a 
human life.
 
11
My concern is somewhat different.  As I mentioned, we have come a 
long way since we started down this path many decades ago.  Much time 
has been spent and much ink has been spilled debating and ultimately 
improving the methodology of CBA.  But we still do not know whether the 
agencies are implementing CBA appropriately and whether the use of CBA 
  I do not believe that is what is intended or what is being done 
in monetizing statistical lives or statistical life years saved. 
 
 4. I say “relatively straightforward” because some costs are actually difficult to 
quantify and/or monetize. 
 5. See Scales, supra note 2, at ADD PAGE; Viscusi, supra note 1, at ADD PAGE. 
 6. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35-36 (2004) (“There are, in fact, built-in biases 
in cost-benefit methods. . . . [W]e will see that the results tilt strongly toward endorsement 
of business as usual . . . .”); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1345, 1391-1400 (2003) (providing examples of rules where agencies were able to monetize 
all the costs but were unable to monetize the benefits in a complete or rigorous way). 
 7. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 § 2(b) (Feb. 17, 1981) (“Regulatory 
action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation 
outweigh the potential costs to society.”). 
 8. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 52,736 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“Each 
agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and, 
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a 
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs.”). 
 9. Such nonmonetized costs and benefits must be considered.  See id. at 51,735 (“Costs 
and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent 
that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are 
difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider.”) (emphasis added). 
 10. There is one glaring exception, namely, homeland security—especially how to 
quantify and monetize the reduction in the risk of a terrorist attack.  See John Graham et al., 
Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. ADD INITIAL PAGE & JUMP CITE (2006). 
 11. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 6, at 61-62. 
CHRISTENSEN_KATZEN 2/3/2011  10:22 PM 
2006] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 103 
produces better regulatory decisions. 
Consider two facts.  First, an analysis is only as good as the data being 
analyzed.  So how good are the data?  Take cost data.  The agencies are 
supposed to be highly knowledgeable and experienced in the matters within 
their jurisdiction—that was the original attraction of setting up 
administrative agencies.12  But as we moved from agencies’ regulating a 
specific sector—like railroads or food and drugs—to agencies’ regulating 
cross-cutting issues like workplace safety or the environment—the rule-
writers cannot be expected to be as familiar with the actual operations of 
the varied factories, construction sites, or farmlands that might be affected 
by the regulations.  Accordingly, in many situations, the cost data either 
originate from, or must be validated by, the regulated entities.  For the most 
part, regulated entities are resistant, if not downright hostile, to the 
proposals and thus have an incentive to overstate the expected costs.  If you 
do not want to do something, you inflate the amount of time, 
inconvenience, and cost you estimate it would take.  Moreover, the 
regulated entities’ cost estimates are all ex ante—offered while the 
regulation is under consideration.  But once the agencies issue the 
regulation and the affected entities have to conform to it, then American 
ingenuity kicks in, and—lo and behold—the affected parties find cheaper 
(less burdensome, less time consuming) ways of inserting the requisite 
procedure in the existing process, installing the added protection, training 
(or retraining) the workforce, or whatever the regulation requires.  
Consequently, the costs in the CBA are almost always overstated.  This is 
not just my own idiosyncratic view; empirical evidence and learned 
opinions corroborate it.13
To be sure, the benefit estimates may be equally suspect.  These are 
 
 
 12. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2261 
(2001) (“The need for expertise emerged as the dominant justification for this enhanced 
bureaucratic power.”). 
 13. William K. Reilly, The EPA’s Cost Underruns, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2003, at A23 
(“[A] review of some of the major regulatory initiatives overseen by the EPA since its 
creation in 1970 reveals a pattern of consistent, often substantial overestimates of their 
economic costs.”); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 41-52 
(2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf; Dallas 
Burtraw et al., Costs and Benefits of Reducing Air Pollutants Related to Acid Rain, 16 
CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 379, 397 (1998) (“[C]ompliance costs have fallen significantly 
compared to prior expectations, though compliance costs do not include all social costs of 
the program.”); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Costs of Health, 
Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2041-44 (2002) (collecting 
studies). 
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often put forward by the interest groups who advocate for the proposed 
regulation or by agency staff who, in effect, “sponsor” the regulation (and 
thus have an incentive to make the proposal look good).  Some empirical 
work shows that the ex ante benefit estimates also may be overstated, 
though not by as much as the cost estimates.14  On the other hand, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the benefits may be understated—either 
deliberately, so as not to provoke allegations of undue enthusiasm for 
regulation or “cooking the books,” or simply because of the difficulty in 
estimating future benefits.  One of my favorite “real life” stories is that, 
apparently, the releasing of the gray wolves in Yellowstone produced 
benefits in the form of restoring the ecology and bringing back other plants 
and animals, which were not even considered when the rule was issued.15
We can speculate about the reliability of CBA estimates, or we can look 
it up—meaning that we can undertake serious systematic empirical 
research of the ex post costs and benefits of major regulations from various 
agencies.  Are our ex ante CBA estimates generally in the ballpark or way 
off the mark?  If the latter, can we figure out why?  Are there systemic 
problems in the data or in the methodology that we can adjust for, so that 
we can go forward using CBA with less debate and greater confidence in 
the results?  Very little time and effort has gone toward this type of 
retrospective analysis, as compared to the time and effort spent arguing 
about the value of statistical lives or the appropriateness of senior 
discounts, for example.  To use language that is in vogue today, wouldn’t 
we all be better off if we focused on the results rather than on the inputs? 
 
This is not to say that, pending such retrospective research, we should 
throw out all the numbers we have generated or foreswear the use of CBA 
until its utility has been verified with certainty.  But it does militate in favor 
of viewing the analytical results as informative rather than dispositive.  I 
further urge that we resist the impulse to sum up the annual ex ante cost 
numbers and add them to the annual costs numbers (so derived) year after 
year and pretend that we have anything like a real estimate of the “total 
regulatory burden” in the United States.  The ex ante cost numbers become 
highly suspect two or three years into the future, but the accuracy of cost 
projections ten to twenty years into the future is pure fantasy.  Again, I am 
not alone on this point: the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
 
 14. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 13, at 45 tbl. 3-1 and 49 n.25. 
 15. Guy Gogliotta, New Predator in Yellowstone Reshapes Park’s Entire Ecosystem, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at A8 (“Wolves stalk the elk, so elk leave the rivers, where they 
are vulnerable.  The willows, cottonwoods and aspens grow, casting shade that cools the 
water to temperatures favored by trout.  Migratory birds return to roost in the new foliage.”). 
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also eschewed the use of such calculations over an extended period,16 and it 
is time that we put this practice to rest.17
The second fact is that CBA (at least a thoughtful, careful, 
comprehensive CBA) takes time and resources, and the more significant 
the proposal, the more time and resources it consumes.
 
18
Why is this happening?  There may be as many different answers as 
there are different agencies.  But one explanation is that if the 
programmatic and analytic staffs were fully integrated and there were truly 
  What are the 
implications of this for what happens at the agencies?  I believe that many 
agencies cut corners.  Remember that, for the most part, a rule is not a 
single amoeba, but rather consists of many interacting pieces.  As a result, 
there are multiple opportunities for CBA to help fashion the most cost 
effective/efficient rules.  Yet, more often than not, the programmatic 
experts who draft the rules and the economists or policy analysts who do 
the CBA are not working hand in glove in an iterative process as the rule is 
developed.  To the contrary, the all too frequent pattern is for the 
programmatic experts to “design” the rule, putting the different pieces 
together, and then when the bulk of the work is done, and shortly before the 
work is sent to the agency’s senior officials or to OMB for review, the 
work gets passed to the agency’s policy office or to the chief economist for 
them to do their work.  The CBA analysis then becomes simply a paper 
exercise that justifies the result reached rather than serving—as it should—
in informing the decision-making. 
 
 16. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 40 (2002)  (“In our future annual 
reports, we plan to improve the estimates by focusing on the last ten years of Federal 
regulations. . . . We do not believe that the estimates of the costs and benefits of regulations 
issued over ten years ago are reliable or very useful for informing current policy 
decisions.”). 
 17. There are other serious methodological flaws in the calculations of total costs by 
Thomas Hopkins, who is the primary author of the huge numbers always cited by opponents 
of regulation.  For a thorough and thoughtful critique of the Hopkins methodology, see 
CURTIS W. COPELAND, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FEDERAL REGULATIONS: EFFORTS TO 
ESTIMATE TOTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RULES 4-9 (2004), available at 
http://www.library.dau.mil/CRS_RL32339.pdf. 
 18. There had been a suggestion in past administration guidance that the thoroughness 
of the study should be commensurate with the importance and complexity of the issue, 
taking into account the need for expedition (as in a potential serious crisis is looming that 
will be irreversible versus this is something we have lived with for decades and very few 
have sustained serious injury or illness) as well as the likely sensitivity of the net benefits of 
the proposal.  Some have blithely said this means an agency should do a CBA of doing a 
CBA.  But how do you know at the outset what the parameters are likely to be—especially 
if the problem is one beset by great uncertainty, both as to the nature or scope of the 
problem and the nature or effectiveness of the proposed solution? 
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an iterative process, rulemaking would inevitably take more time, often 
much more time.  And rulemaking already takes a lot of time—some would 
say too much time,19
More importantly, to do CBA right takes resources—such as staff time 
and/or consulting contracts—and agencies do not have the resources to 
spend on this type of venture.  In the last decade we have placed (some 
would say piled) many requirements on the agencies that they must fulfill 
during the rule development: from notifying and consulting with certain 
constituencies,
 particularly where there is an imminent danger that 
might produce irreversible adverse effects. 
20 to performing analytical exercises pertaining to the subject 
matter being considered,21 to analytical exercises going to matters beyond 
their jurisdiction but nonetheless implicated by their proposals.22
 
 19. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A 
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528 (1997) (“By the mid-1990s, it 
has become so difficult for agencies to promulgate major rules that some regulating 
programs have ground to a halt and others have succeeded only because agencies have 
resorted to alternative policymaking vehicles.”); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency 
Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1390 (2004) (“[T]oday, 
promulgating an important legislative rule is a labor-intensive enterprise.”). 
  These are 
not trivial tasks, and they require resources to be done right.  Yet, the 
agencies do not have the necessary resources.  They were not flush even 
during the Clinton years when there were surpluses as far as the eye could 
see.  Today, unless the agencies can claim some relationship to defense or 
homeland security, they are clearly strapped for resources: their budgets are  
being cut even as their fixed expenses increase.  In a public forum, I once 
asked John Graham, then-Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs at OMB, why President Bush’s budget did not include 
an allowance for the analysis that the Administration says is so critical to 
rational regulatory decision making.  He responded that the agencies do not 
ask for it.  This is not surprising—one would rather spend money on new 
initiatives than on providing support for a pending proposal.  Still, I 
 20. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1534 (2006) (requiring 
agencies to permit elected state, local, and tribal governments “to provide meaningful and 
timely input”); Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 609(b)(1)-(4) (detailing 
procedures for convening a panel of federal employees for the purpose of receiving and 
responding to advice and recommendations from representatives of affected small 
businesses). 
 21. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A  § 1535 (“[B]efore 
promulgating any rule for which a written statement is required under section 1532 of this 
title, the agency shall identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives 
and from those alternatives select the least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome 
alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule.”); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 
51,735, 51,740 § 6(a)(3)(c) (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 22. See, e,g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (2006); 
Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (Feb. 5, 1996). 
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followed up by asking why OMB does not include an allowance for such 
analysis, given that OMB does not hesitate to make other additions to the 
agencies’ requests in the President’s budget to promote Administration 
priorities.  I did not receive an answer.  But, based on my experience, even 
if the President’s budget included money for analysis, it would probably 
not survive in Congress, which would rather have a new project for the 
home folks than appropriate money to make government work better. 
Given the realities of the regulatory landscape, at least as I see it, I 
seriously question whether all the work being done to refine and polish 
CBA methodology emphasizes the wrong syllable.  It would be better, in 
my opinion, to devote some resources to retrospective analyses and/or 
organization studies. Because the agencies do not have the resources, I 
would urge those who underwrite many of the ongoing projects in this 
field—industry (which believes CBA works—at least for them), the 
academy, and foundations, among others—to step up to do this work and 
identify what, if any, obstacles exist to the agencies doing what we are 
asking them to do: rational regulatory decision making. 
 
